On Free Will
by Alice Nelson,
Centre for Thomistic Studies
The Act of the Will is much less known to us than the Act of the
Intellect. However, it is not impossible for the Human Intellect
to prove the Freedom of the Will, basing this proof on the Root of Freedom, which is
Understood-Good.
The Will is the Appetitive Power of the
Intellect, so that before any Act of the Will can take place, there
must be an Act of Intellect preceding it; for the
Will is not a 'Knower', it is a 'Goer'.
It goes-towards what the Intellect presents to it as
Good and Appetible (desirable), and away-from what is presented to it by the
Intellect as being non-Appetible.
Statement of Problem
The Problem about Free-Will is this: as said above, the
Will is subordinated to the Intellect, its Acts must be about what
the Intellect presents to it. But the Intellect is
not Free, it is tied to Evidence. Consequently, it seems, that the Will is not
Free either.
One could go no further and decide that the Will is not Free, since it is under
Compulsion to follow the Intellect. But the difficulty is this; we are quite conscious that
the Will is Free. This is very obvious from the way we Act: for we are conscious when we do something
that we need not have done it, that we could have acted in another way; besides, we have Laws, and Laws pre-suppose that we are
Free; we have such things as Rewards and
Punishments. Sometimes we Praise people and at other times we Blame them; all these things point to the fact that the
Will is Free.
The solution of this Problem must consist in reconciling these Two (2)
Truths,
1. That the Will is an
Intellectual Appetite and must follow Intellect and
2. That the Will is Free to
Choose this or that, or to act or not to act;
for no Problem is solved by denying either of the terms, for to deny either of them would be to suppress the Problem.
The Freedom of the Will is exercised in the:
Act-of-Choice or Election, which follows and is subordinated-to the
Act of Intellect, which is called the Practico-Practical Judgment.
Two (2) Steps/Actions in Freedom of the Will
(Step-1) Act of Intellect
(Practico-Practical Judgment)
|
|
(Step-2) Act of Choice
by Will
|
At this point it will be a great help to us to have a good look at these Two (2) Acts. Here we are
considering both these Acts as they are about some Particular Good, which of necessity is a Limited or a Mixed-Good; Mixed,
because it is made up of Act and Potency; for as we see in other places, the Will is
not Free about a Pure-Good or Good-in-Common or Universal-Good.
Since the Will is an Appetite for Understood-Good, and not ‘This
Good’, by its Nature it has to Appetite what seems to it to be Absolutely-Good, with no Admixture of
Evil. Regarding a Mixed-Good, the Will is
together Able and Unable to Will it. It follows then that when the
Intellect understands something to be Somewise-Good and Somewise-not-Good, the
Will is Indifferent to will-it or
not to will-it.
Still in order to do the Elective Act, the Will must make a Choice between
One Particular-Good and Another, or a Choice
to act or not to act. But for the
Will to pass from a Position where it is Indifferent, to
act or not to act, or to Choose One thing rather
than Another, and to arrive at a Determinate Choice, there has to be an Act of
Intellect which makes it possible for the Will
to-come-to a Decision, that is, the Will cannot move from Indetermination to
Determination by itself without the Intellect intervening, for that would imply
Contradiction, since to be able to choose and not to be able to
choose are Contradictories.
In other words, the Will follows the Practico-Practical
Judgment, which is about a Particular-Good which the Will may or may-not
go-for, since every Particular-Good has in it a reason to be Loved by the Will, and a
reason for the Will not to Love it.
If the Will is going to make a Choice, it must follow a
Judgment by the Intellect presenting the thing to it as Completely-Good and as
Completely-Befitting it. This means that, for the Will to will the Particular-Good, there
must occur a Change in the Practico-Practical Judgment, so that this Change must be
caused either by the Particular-Good itself, or by the Will; for if
Two (2) things are not in agreement, they can be brought to agree only by Changing
One or the Other.
Since the Particular-Good remains the same, the Change must occur in the Will, so that
the Intellect can be presented with a New Object by the
Practico-Practical Judgment and make a Decision about the Particular Thing in question.
But, the Intellect can Judge that the Particular Thing
befits the Will, only if New Evidence arises. This Evidence can only come
from the Will itself since, as said above, the Particular Thing remains unchanged, so it
must be from the Will acquiring a New Reality within it, that is a New Order of
Befittingness towards that Particular Thing, so that the Will has itself towards that Thing,
as from its Nature, it has itself towards Universal-Good.
This Order of Befittingness or Coaptation of the Will for the Thing makes it possible
for the Intellect to Judge that the Particular Thing it is
considering, is that which Perfectly suits the Will here-and-now, because now the
Intellect is looking, not at the Will
alone, but at the Will together with its Dispositions. Then, this
new Judgment by the Practico-Practical Intellect becomes the
Form according to which the Will makes its Choice. It is about this new
Judgment by the Practico-Practical Judgment that Aristotle said
"of what sort each one is, such is the end that to him seems good". In other words, we
Judge as we are disposed.
It follows from this that it is the Will itself that causes (efficiently) and
determines (objectively) the very Form according to which it Acts, and that it does this not from necessity, since from its
Nature the Will is indifferent to Appetize this or that Particular-Good.
But, the question may be asked, 'How' does the Will effect this Change in itself? The
answer is that it does this by using the new Judgment put before it by the
Intellect, for this new Judgment is the Potential Mover of the
Will. It uses it as a Man uses a Crutch; the Crutch moves the Man and the Man moves it.
Let us recall here Two (2) Principles: the Principle that causes are
causes to each other in diverse order of cause. This Principle is the key to the problem of
Free-Will. (Causation and Cause are simultaneous in duration; the Priority of the Cause is only an Ontological Priority).
The Principle of Denis is that every perfection loved, inclines the Will towards it. Saint Thomas
says in Con. Gent. IV, a 19, "the Loved is in the Will as inclining and in a
certain manner intrinsically compelling the living (Subject) towards the very thing loved". It is in this way that
the loved is in the lover.
Just as in Understanding, something is produced in the Intellect, namely a Concept,
wherein the Thing is known and the Concept is specified by the known Thing — which is the Object — so in the
Will when it loves something, a certain Inclination or Love or Weightedness arises in it, which Inclination or
Coaptation inclines it towards the Beloved.
By this Coaptation, which arises in the Will, the
Will is changed and consequently it presents a New Object to the Intellect.
This makes the Intellect Judge that the Thing is Perfectly
Suited to the Will and makes it possible for the
Will to will it. But what makes the Will inclined towards the Thing in the
First Place is a certain Connaturality of the Will with
the Thing, a certain Inclination towards it (there is a certain Mystery here). This
Inclination in the Will is a Physical Reality, specified by the loved Thing which makes
the Beloved present to the Will.
It is the Will itself that is the Efficient Cause of its Weightedness, it makes itself
love by loving. It is by loving that the Will produces in itself its lopsidedness towards
the loved. John does not love Mary until his love has produced that lopsidedness. So John’s love for Mary is determined by his Dispositions.
So it is that the Weighted Will presents New Evidence to the
Practico-Practical Judgement which unlike the Speculativo-Practical Judgment (which merely
Judges that something is Good), Judges the
Good Thing in relation to the Will as it is affected by its Weightedness (i.e. by its
Dispositions).
The Will can will One Thing in preference to
Another only if, by itself, it adjusts itself to it. In this way the
Will turns an Indifferent Form into a Determinate Form (i.e. a ‘can-move’
into a ‘does-move’) i.e. uses the Practico-Practical Judgment to make
its Choice.
In Two (2) Orders of Causality the Practico-Practical Judgment goes
before the Act of Choice, and in Two (2) Orders of Causality the Choice goes before
the Practico-Practical Judgment. This Reciprocity of Causes is what is peculiar to the Free-Act, it is found
only in the Free-Act. This interaction between the
Two (2) Acts has to be explained.
The Two (2) Causalities exercised by the Intellect
on the Will are: Objective-Causality and Final-Causality. The
Intellect from itself has no Efficient-Causality. It has only Extrinsic Formal-Causality, that is, Specific-Causality,
by doing that, it provides the Will with Final-Causality. By the Particular Object presented by
the Intellect to the Will is specified the
Nature of the Quality Weighting the Will towards this Object.
The Will exercises only One (1) Act, by which it has
Two (2) Influences on the Intellect;
a) Objective-Causality and b) Efficient-Causality. This Act is formally One (1), but virtually
Two (2) (Causations). As it is Efficient, it explains the ‘be’ of
the Practico-Practical Judgment in the Intellect, as it is
Objective it explains the ‘be-such’ of the Practico-Practical
Judgment.
The Two (2) Causalities the Will exercises on the
Intellect are: Efficient (bends the Intellect down
from considering Good, simply to considering a Particular-Good) and Objective-Causality
(provides the Intellect with an Evident Reality which it can Judge). So
it is the Will that provides the Intellect
with a New Object, and also Moves it Efficiently to make the Judgment about this New Object.
Therefore, it is the Will that picks the Form according to which it Acts. But to pick the Form is to
pick the ‘be’, and to pick the ‘be’ is to pick the
‘do’. But to pick one’s do is to be Free.
Therefore the Will is Free.
It remains to explain that the loved is in the lover in a
different fashion from which the known is in the knower. For
the Will is not loving the thing as it is something in it, but as it is out in the real,
whereas the concept is that wherein the thing is known. "Good and bad are in things, but true and false are in
mind".
Although it is true to say that the known is in the knower and the
loved is in the lover, it must be realized that the Intentionality of
the Intellect is vastly different from the Intentionality of the
Will; for whereas Knowledge is terminated at the word as it is in the Intellect,
in such fashion that the Intellect reposes in it, the loved existing Intentionally in the
Will is there as an Impulse whereby the Will
is Weighted and Inclined towards the thing outside, although it is vitally elicited by the Will for
"insofar does it Weight the Will, insofar as it is voluntary and not from without, for the Will is inclined only
voluntarily" John of Saint Thomas Curs. Theol. IV ed vives 927 disp. 12, a. 7, n XII.
It all comes from the Will and all from the Object, but from the Object as the
Specificative, and from the Will as the Efficient Cause.
Conclusion:
All Particular-Goods are equally unfit to move the Will, because all of them are Infinitely
Deficient from being a Universal-Good.
Therefore, if the Will prefers One Particular-Good to
Another, it is not necessitated by the Object of the Intellect
(because the Intellect is tied to Evidence and does not move the
Will efficiently), but because it Chooses to do so.
Therefore, the Will is Free, since it is not under Necessity to
Will what it Wills – neither by Necessity of
Nature nor by Necessity of Instinct. It follows that the Will can’t
Will a Particular-Good unless it Wills it Freely, it is the Cause of its own Loves. So the
Two (2) terms of the problem, are solved. The Will is
subordinated to the Intellect, but nevertheless it is Free, since it has
Dominative Indifference over its Acts.
This Proof is reduced to the Fundamental Doctrine of Act and Potency, since it is because there is Potency in things, that the
Will is Free about them.
|
